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767 
THE DECLINING ALLURE OF BEING 
“AMERICAN” AND THE PROLIFERATION OF 
CORPORATE TAX INVERSIONS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY EFFORTS TO 
CURTAIL THE INVERSION TREND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of tax policy, within which there is rarely broad-based 
consensus, there are few topics as polarizing as corporate tax inversions. 
An inversion is a paper transaction in which a US corporation 
reincorporates abroad to realize strategic tax benefits, without actually 
transplanting its operations overseas.
1
 These transactions necessarily 
reduce the US corporate income tax base, because although an inverted 
corporation is still taxed the same amount on income earned within the 
United States, it will no longer have to remit tax payments to the US 
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) for income earned abroad.2 This 
reduction in the tax base is especially troubling given that the national debt 
exceeds $19 trillion,
3
 the US credit rating is experiencing unprecedented 
volatility,
4
 and the annual US government deficit ranges from hundreds of 
billions to more than a trillion dollars per year.
5
 Given the current state of 
the domestic economy, the notion of successful US corporations 
nominally moving their headquarters abroad to alleviate their tax burden is 
unpalatable for many.
6
 Others do not fault inverters for acting in the 
interests of their shareholders, and simply see the trend as evidence of the 
 
 
 1. James Mann, Note, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of a Larger Problem, the Corporate 
Income Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 521 (2005) (discussing the tax costs and benefits of inversions). 
 2. See id. at 528. 
 3. See USDEBTCLOCK.ORG, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
 4. See generally William Constantine, Justice or Retribution: The S&P Downgrade and 
Lawsuit, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 504 (2014) (discussing the 2011 downgrade of US debt by 
Standard and Poor’s). 
 5. The seven-year average annual deficit is approximately $1 trillion. Dave Manuel, A History 
of Surpluses and Deficits in the United States, DAVEMANUEL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/ 
history-of-deficits-and-surpluses-in-the-united-states.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/2FXF-8KE6; see also Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POLICY CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016), 
archived at https://perma.cc/DX3Q-4M39. In 2014, individual income tax receipts accounted for 
roughly $1.4 trillion in revenue, whereas corporate income tax receipts accounted for “only” about 
$321 billion. Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, supra. While any change to the tax base has 
important consequences, the vast majority of the income taxes collected are from individuals, limiting 
the impact of changes to the corporate tax regime. 
 6. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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need for substantial corporate tax reform so that the United States can 
become more globally competitive as a home for businesses.
7
 However, 
those with opposing viewpoints may be closer together than they realize, 
and meaningful reform may be attainable if productive dialogue can be 
facilitated.
8
 
This Note provides an overview of trends in corporate taxation,
9
 the 
thirty-year history of inversions and governmental attempts to contain 
them,
10
 and an analysis of recent anti-inversion regulations proposed by 
Treasury in September 2014.
11
 Finally, this Note critiques the legislative 
and regulatory framework that attempts to restrict the practice of 
inversions, and provides a suggestion for constructively responding to the 
trend.
12
 Given the passion and diversity of viewpoints on the issue, 
arriving at a national consensus on how to respond to the recent 
proliferation of inversions presents an extraordinary challenge. There may, 
however, be enough common ground for lawmakers to craft a solution that 
removes the incentive for corporations to invert, thereby shoring up the tax 
base and making the US economy more competitive globally.
13
 In light of 
the substantial—and rapidly growing—national debt, there is no better 
time to critically reevaluate the policies and priorities of corporate 
taxation. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE INVERSION PHENOMENON 
A. Domestic and Global Taxation of Corporations 
 The United States has consistently taxed corporations since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 
1909
14
 was passed.
15
 Under this law, all annual corporate income in excess 
 
 
 7. See infra notes 139–74 and accompanying text. 
 8. The tax code “would seem ready made for a bipartisan compromise to cut the rate, cut the 
deductions, and make the system overall more fair and efficient. It is easy in theory to imagine a bill 
that a Republican Congress might pass that President Obama would happily sign.” Neil Irwin, Where 
Might Obama and the G.O.P. Agree? Here Are Possibilities, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/upshot/where-might-obama-and-the-gop-agree-here-are-possibili 
ties.html?_r=1&abt=0002&abg=1. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Parts II.D, IV. 
 13. “‘The political noise on inversions obscures the broad similarity of the political parties’ 
approach to tax reform,’ wrote Terry Haines, head of political analysis at ISI Evercore, in a report.” 
Irwin, supra note 8. 
 14. Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, 112–17. 
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of $5,000 was taxed at a rate of 1 percent.
16
 Several years later, the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution
17
 was ratified, permitting the 
federal government to levy direct income taxes on both citizens and 
corporations.
18
 By 1918, corporations were being taxed at a rate of 12 
percent of annual income earned in excess of $2,000.
19
 The maximum 
corporate tax rate then fluctuated between 10 percent and 19 percent until 
1940, when it leapt to 38.3 percent to support wartime spending.
20
 While 
there continues to be a degree of annual fluctuation, the US corporate tax 
rate has not fallen much below 35 percent,
21
 where it remains today.
22
 In 
many ways, the decision to tax the income of corporations is a policy 
determination reflecting values of progressive taxation,
23
 a system under 
which individuals and corporations with greater income bear a larger tax 
burden.
24
 Arguably, much of the distinction between corporate and 
individual taxation is illusory because “corporations are owned, directly or 
indirectly, by individuals who (ultimately) receive a share of the 
corporations’ incomes.”25 
The United States utilizes a “worldwide” system of corporate taxation, 
under which US corporations are taxed by the United States on income 
 
 
 15. For a discussion of the history of corporate taxation in the United States, see Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 
(1990). 
 16. JACK TAYLOR, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICAL DATA SECTION, CORPORATION 
INCOME TAX BRACKETS AND RATES, 1909–2002 287–89 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-soi/02corate.pdf (providing annual US corporate income tax rates since 1909). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 18. Id. (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”). 
 19. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 287. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 287–89. 
 22. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2015 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 
1120: U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURN 17 (2016), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i1120.pdf (establishing an escalating corporate tax rate, peaking at 38 percent for income in excess 
of $15 million but not over $18,333,333, and returning to 35 percent for all income earned over that 
amount). 
 23. See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, WHY WE NEED THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 1–2 (2013), 
available at http://ctj.org/pdf/whyweneedacorporatetax.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WKV8-
TCWV (offering several justifications for the taxation of corporations, including the need to tax 
retained profits, the fact that two-thirds of corporate profits would never be payable as personal 
income tax, and the fact that the corporate income tax is very progressive). 
 24. See Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 117 (1999) (postulating that “each dollar matters more to a 
poor person than it does to a wealthy person” and that this serves as a justification for progressive 
taxation). 
 25. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 284. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
770 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:767 
 
 
 
 
earned both domestically and internationally.
26
 Conversely, the vast 
majority of other countries utilize a “territorial” system of corporate 
taxation, whereby they only tax corporate income earned domestically.
27
 
While multinational corporations conduct business around the globe, 
treatment of multinationals under the United States’ Internal Revenue 
Code (the “Code”) turns primarily on whether a corporation is classified as 
“domestic” or “foreign,” regardless of where it is formally incorporated.28 
At the most basic level, this is determined using a “place-of-incorporation 
test.”29 Justifications for the place-of-incorporation test include a theory of 
legal personhood,
30
 administrative simplicity,
31
 symbolic importance,
32
 
and a need for revenue.
33
 While these explanations are intellectually 
satisfying to varying degrees, one might particularly question the validity 
of administrative simplicity as a justification
34
 for a system that puts 
businesses incorporated in the United States at a disadvantage compared to 
their foreign competition.
35
 
 
 
 26. Pat Regnier, Everything You Need to Know About Companies Leaving America for Taxes, 
TIME MONEY (Sept. 23, 2014), http://time.com/money/3378719/corporate-tax-inversions-leaving- 
america/; see also Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The 
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX 
REV. 475, 564–65 (2005) (arguing that a “benefits theory” justifies the worldwide corporate taxation 
system employed by the United States); Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, 
Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 342 (2004) (explaining that the tax 
on income earned abroad is the incremental difference between the United States’ corporate tax rate 
and the rate of the country in which the income is derived). 
 27. See Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the 
Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 
552–53 (2003) (explaining differences between the United States’ system of worldwide corporate 
taxation and the territorial system, which is overwhelmingly favored by other countries). 
 28. Id. at 551–52. “In the case of a foreign corporation, the United States imposes a tax only on 
income that has a sufficient nexus with the country.” Id. at 552. 
 29. See Kirsch, supra note 26, at 567. Under the place-of-incorporation approach, the jurisdiction 
in which a corporation is chartered determines whether it is counted as a domestic or foreign 
corporation. See id. 
 30. Id. (“Perhaps the most fundamental justification for a place-of-incorporation test is that the 
corporation derives its legal existence from the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. Under this 
view, the corporation, as an artificial person, resides in the country whose laws create the legal 
fiction.”). 
 31. Id. at 569 (emphasis added) (“Perhaps the strongest justification for a place-of-incorporation 
test . . . is its administrative simplicity.”). 
 32. Id. at 572 (arguing that aligning the tax treatment of corporations with a public perception 
that a corporation is “American” may justify the place-of-incorporation test). 
 33. Id. at 573 (explaining that the United States can collect more in taxes using the place-of-
incorporation test than it might be able to using another test). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 576 (“[A]dministrative simplicity standing alone is a feeble normative basis 
upon which to base a definition with such significant tax consequences. After all, many arbitrary rules 
might be administratively simple, yet would not form a sound basis for imposing tax.”). 
 35. See id. at 579 (demonstrating that corporations originally incorporated outside the United 
States have significant advantages compared to similar corporations incorporated domestically, even 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/8
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Proponents of the United States’ worldwide corporate tax system 
invoke a “benefits theory”36 to justify what may otherwise seem to be an 
uncompetitive scheme. This theory postulates that favorable and well-
enforced property and contract laws, as well as more sophisticated public 
infrastructure, can be used to validate the US system,
37
 even though it 
objectively results in greater tax liability for domestic corporations. 
Proponents also argue that worldwide taxation incentivizes domestic 
businesses to locate their active investments in the United States, rather 
than moving them abroad simply for tax reasons.
38
 
In addition to the United States’ comparatively less desirable39 
worldwide theory of corporate taxation, the 35 percent maximum rate is 
no longer competitive from the perspective of multinational corporations.
40
 
The extent to which the United States’ corporate tax scheme has fallen 
behind the systems used by other countries is evidenced by its tax 
competitiveness being ranked thirty-second out of thirty-four countries in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
by Forbes magazine.
41
 This decline in competitiveness has not escaped 
notice. Former President Bill Clinton recently told CNBC:  
 
 
when operations and management are very similar, because of tax advantages associated with being 
incorporated abroad). 
 36. Id. at 564–65. 
 37. Id. (noting that “protections of property and contract law, the benefits of the transportation 
infrastructure, and other public services including police and fire protection” are all justifications 
advanced under the “benefits theory”). 
 38. Theoretically, this is because there should be no tax advantage for earning income abroad, 
rather than domestically, as long as a business remains incorporated in the United States. See Kun, 
supra note 26, at 332. 
 39. Worldwide taxation is less desirable for US multinational corporations seeking to maximize 
profits for shareholders, who would benefit from the lower tax burden that would result from a 
territorial system. 
 40. “When the current 35% [US] corporate tax rate was signed into law in 1993, it was on par 
with other nations around the globe. Many of those foreign [countries] have since lowered their 
corporate tax rates, setting the scene for the current tax inversion-friendly environment.” Laura 
Lorenzetti, Clinton Says Corporate Tax Rate He Approved Needs to Change, FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 
2014, 1:19 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/23/clinton-says-corporate-tax-rate-he-approved-needs-to-
change/. The US corporate tax rate has remained high, despite declining averages on every other 
continent over the past decade. See Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG, https://home.kpmg. 
com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/YDP5-ABP9. 
 41. The list was ordered by corporate, consumption, property, and individual tax rankings, as 
well as a ranking of the countries’ international tax rules. Kyle Pomerleau & Andrew Lundeen, The 
U.S. Ranks 32nd Out of 34 OECD Countries in Tax Code Competitiveness, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014, 
3:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/09/22/the-u-s-ranks-32nd-out-of-34-oecd-countries-
in-tax-code-competitiveness/. 
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America has to face the fact that we have not reformed our 
corporate tax laws . . . . We have the highest overall corporate tax 
rates in the world. And we are now the only OECD country that 
also taxes overseas earnings on the difference between what the 
companies pay overseas and what they pay in America.
42
 
Clinton, who was President when the current corporate tax structure was 
signed into law in 1993,
43
 has acknowledged that the global economy was 
in a different place at that time and has accepted that reform is now 
necessary.
44
 President Obama has also called for “revenue-neutral” reform 
of the corporate tax structure, but thus far he “has not put much political 
capital behind the proposal.”45 
While the relatively heavy tax burden placed on United States 
corporations allows the government to collect more in corporate tax 
revenue,
46
 there are major countervailing considerations that suggest 
significant reform is needed.
47
 One issue created by the current corporate 
tax regime is that US corporations are incentivized to hold earnings 
overseas, rather than repatriating foreign-earned income to the United 
States,
48
 at which point such earnings would be immediately subject to US 
 
 
 42. Zach Carter, Obama Will Probably Be Annoyed with Bill Clinton’s Latest Corporate Tax 
Proposal, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/23/obama-
bill-clinton-corporate-taxes_n_5870908.html, archived at https://perma.cc/NR52-7GS8 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Clinton suggested that the government could collect “at least as much 
money” as provided for by current tax receipts by closing loopholes and simultaneously lowering the 
overall corporate tax rate. Id. In comparison to the current 35 percent US corporate tax rate, Canada’s 
rate is “between 11% and 15%” and Ireland’s is “about 12.5%.” Lorenzetti, supra note 40. 
 43. Lorenzetti, supra note 40. 
 44. Clinton recalled the situation in 1993, explaining that “[w]e were deciding we had to reduce 
the deficit to get interest rates down and spark an investment boom in America, and it worked.” John 
Hayward, The Clintons Torpedo Obama’s ‘Corporate Inversion’ Campaign, BREITBART (Sept. 24, 
2014), http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/09/24/The-Clintons-torpedo-Obama-s-corporate-inve 
rsion-campaign, archived at https://perma.cc/CZ9V-9BX8 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 45. See Carter, supra note 42. Obama’s approval rating suffered from the beginning of 2013 
through the fall of 2014, when the Notice was issued. Gallup Daily: Obama Job Approval, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/113980/Gallup-Daily-Obama-Job-Approval.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 
2016). 
 46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Using a place-of-incorporation test subjects more 
corporate earnings to US taxation. Id. 
 47. See Pomerleau & Lundeen, supra note 41 (“The U.S.’s tax code, which is far out of line with 
other nations’, is driving investment overseas, reducing our economic potential.”). 
 48. KIMBERLY CLAUSING, TAX POLICY CTR., CORPORATE INVERSIONS 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/413207-corporate-inversions.pdf (articulating that 
many US corporations have succumbed to their own tax planning success by accumulating large sums 
of income overseas, which they cannot feasibly use for dividends or repurchasing shares of stock). 
According to Bill Clinton, “‘[a] lot of [corporate] executives, even if they wanted to bring the money 
home, they think [the US tax regime] is crazy.’” Hayward, supra note 44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/8
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corporate income taxes.
49
 There may be $1-2 trillion held overseas by US 
corporations seeking to manage their tax burdens.
50
 Congress addressed 
this issue in 1994 by granting a “tax holiday” for the repatriation of 
dividends at a reduced rate,
51
 but that relief has not been offered since.
52
 
Despite the arguments made by those in favor of additional tax holidays,
53
 
others oppose their usage.
54
 Critics point out that tax holidays incentivize 
corporations to leave their foreign earnings overseas and simply wait for 
Congress to grant relief.
55
  
Another consequence of the current US corporate tax system is that it 
slows domestic investment by US corporations,
56
 while simultaneously 
making it more difficult for them to compete with multinationals 
incorporated abroad.
57
 This is a major concern for the United States, given 
that a quarter of its economy is tied to exports.
58
 In light of these 
problems,
59
 many commentators fear that the Code is pushing investment 
overseas and minimizing US economic power.
60
  
 
 
 49. See CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 3. Deferring the repatriation of earnings allows a 
corporation to delay the payment of US taxes, perhaps indefinitely. See id. 
 50. CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 4 (estimating that “nearly a trillion dollars” may be held abroad 
by US corporations); see also Carter, supra note 42 (noting that Bill Clinton estimates that “nearly $2 
trillion” is being held overseas). 
 51. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; see also 
CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 5 (explaining that dividends could be temporarily repatriated at a rate of 
5.25 percent). 
 52. CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 5. 
 53. Tax holidays result in an immediate infusion of tax revenue, albeit at a lower than usual rate, 
and stimulate spending by corporations and their shareholders. See generally Robert Bloink, Is United 
States Corporate Tax Policy Outsourcing America? A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Tax Holiday 
for Trapped CFC Earnings, 56 VILL. L. REV. 833 (2012). Proponents include Bill Clinton, who 
“called to ‘give incentives to repatriate . . . nearly $2 trillion overseas,’ suggesting that the U.S. grant a 
tax holiday on money deliberately kept out of the country to avoid paying U.S. taxes on it.” Carter, 
supra note 42. 
 54. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, Positively Un-American Tax Dodges, FORTUNE (July 7, 2014, 7:00 
AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/taxes-offshore-dodge/ (arguing that inverting corporations are 
“un-American” and that tax holidays provide the wrong incentives to corporations). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Jim Randle, White House Criticizes Corporate Tax ‘Inversions’ as Squabble Escalates, 
VOICE OF AMERICA (Sept. 2, 2014, 5:46 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/white-house-looks-to-
stem-corporate-tax-inversions/2436506.html, archived at https://perma.cc/E4XN-HFEN. 
 57. Id. (“When foreign firms have lower expenses, [based on their lower corporate tax burden,] 
they can offer lower prices than American firms.”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Pomerleau & Lundeen, supra note 41; see also infra Part IV. 
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B. Corporate Tax Inversions: The Reaction of US Business 
Given the unfavorable treatment of US corporations
61
 under an 
outdated corporate tax system that has had no significant overhaul since 
the mid-1990s,
62
 many businesses are reincorporating abroad to take 
advantage of more favorable tax laws.
63
 This is accomplished through a 
process that has come to be known as “inversion.”64 In an inversion, a US 
corporate parent utilizes one of several methods
65
 to effectuate its 
reincorporation in either a low-tax or no-tax foreign jurisdiction.
66
 This 
generally occurs when a US corporation acquires or merges with a foreign 
one.
67
 The US company then becomes either a subsidiary of the foreign 
corporation or establishes a new overseas parent that is incorporated in a 
tax-friendly country, which holds both the US corporation and its foreign 
counterpart.
68
 When an inversion transaction is successful, “U.S. tax can 
be avoided on foreign operations and on distributions to the foreign parent, 
and there are opportunities to reduce income from U.S. operations by 
payments of fees, interest, and royalties to the foreign entity.”69 
Accordingly, the extent to which inversion transactions are regulated is of 
tremendous consequence to both corporations seeking to maximize after-
tax profits
70
 and to the United States government, which receives 11 
percent of its annual revenues from corporate income taxes.
71
 
 
 
 61. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text. 
 62. Lorenzetti, supra note 40. 
 63. See CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 2. 
 64. “The term ‘inversion’ itself refers to the upside-down structure that often results from the 
transaction, with the smaller foreign holding corporation now owning the larger U.S. operating 
company.” Joseph A. Tootle, Note, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business 
Activities,” 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 355 (2013). Inversions are distinguishable from other foreign 
business arrangements like outsourcing and “runaway plants.” Kirsch, supra note 26, at 478–80. 
 65. See Kun, supra note 26, at 319–28. 
 66. John Kelly, Note, Haven or Hell: Securities Exchange Listing Standards and Other Proposed 
Reforms as a Disincentive for Corporate Inversion Transactions, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 199, 
199 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 200–02. 
 68. Id. at 200–01. 
 69. New Guidance Describes Forthcoming Regs Cracking Down on Corporate Inversions, 
CHECKPOINT DAILY NEWSSTAND (Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting News, Carrollton, Tex.), Sept. 
24, 2014, available at https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/media-resources/news-media-resources/ checkpoint-
news/daily-newsstand/new-guidance-describes-forthcoming-regs-cracking-corporate-inversions/, archived 
at https://perma.cc/F8Z9-GF28 [hereinafter Forthcoming Regs]. 
 70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 71. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO FEDERAL TAX 
REVENUES COME FROM? (2016), available at http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-where-do-
federal-tax-revenues-come-from; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/8
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The first major inversion transaction that garnered significant attention 
from the US public occurred in 1983, when McDermott International 
reincorporated in Panama.
72
 Congress responded quickly with changes to 
the Code
73
 to complete what has now become the prototypical cycle: 
businesses find innovative ways to avoid the pricey US tax regime, and 
Congress and its regulatory counterparts scramble to cut off the new 
escape route.
74
 Even so, US corporations continue to pursue inversions 
with increasing frequency.
75
 From January 2011 through August 2014, “12 
corporate inversions involving US companies [had] been completed, and 
at least 10 more prospective deals [were] in the works.”76 
While a number of factors
77
 may contribute to the increase in 
inversions, the primary motivation remains the fact that multinationals can 
lower their global tax liability by relocating to a country espousing a 
territorial tax system.
78
 Upon expatriation, formerly US multinationals are 
no longer subject to certain unfavorable tax provisions, like those found in 
IRS Subpart F,
79
 or to the rules relating to interest expense allocation.
80
 
 
 
 72. Kelly, supra note 66, at 199. 
 73. “Congress promptly remedied the deficiency in the Subpart F rules by adopting a narrowly 
constrained measure that denied entities the specific benefit of the McDermott transaction.” Kun, 
supra note 26, at 316. However, the form and purposes underlying recent inversions are significantly 
different from those seen in the McDermott reincorporation. Id. 
 74. See Hayward, supra note 44 (internal quotation mark omitted) (equating the war on 
inversions to a strategy of “kneecap[ing] everyone who tries to climb over the wall to escape our nutty 
tax system”). 
 75. Inversions may be occurring with more frequency because the inversion solution is 
increasingly perceived as an acceptable corporate strategy and because the amount of cash eligible for 
repatriation, but still held offshore, has grown to staggering heights. CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 5. 
 76. Id. at 2. AbbVie targeting Shire ($54 billion), Burger King targeting Tim Hortons ($11 
billion), and Mylan targeting Abbott Labs ($5.3 billion) were the largest pending tax inversion deals as 
of September 2014. John D. McKinnon et al., New Tax Rules Will Slow, Not Halt, Inversion Deals, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014, 12:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/firms-to-feel-tax-inversion-
crackdown-for-now-1411504445. “Thirteen . . . deals worth $178 billion [were] announced [in 2014], 
according to Dealogic.” Lorenzetti, supra note 40. 
 77. Factors may include: 
(1) modest transactional tax costs; (2) continued access to capital markets, market acceptance, 
and eligibility for government contracts following the inversion; (3) corporate motivations 
and the absence of shareholder awareness, including inadequate emphasis on corporate 
governance changes; (4) non-enforcement of potential anti-inversion measures; and 
(5) deficiencies in the conceptual framework of the tax law for the taxation of multinationals. 
Kun, supra note 26, at 359. Inversions may have increased because of shareholder turnover, declines 
in stock markets, and growing acceptance of inversions. Kelly, supra note 66, at 200. Inversions also 
generally cause at least a marginal increase in stock price. See id. at 204–05. 
 78. Tootle, supra note 64, at 356. “Expatriated multinationals can further reduce their worldwide 
tax liability by entering into ‘earnings stripping’ or ‘base erosion’ transactions with their U.S. 
operating companies.” Id. 
 79. Subpart F rules “require[] U.S. shareholders of ‘controlled foreign corporations’ (CFCs) to 
pay U.S. tax on their pro rata share of certain types of CFC income.” Id. at 358. 
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Ultimately, corporations invert if they believe that anticipated future tax 
benefits
81
 resulting from the inversion outweigh any perceived unpatriotic 
sentiment
82
 and the added regulatory burden associated with the 
transaction.
83
 
C. Criticism of Inversions and Policies Seeking to Stem the Tide 
Notwithstanding the economic benefits realized by corporations that 
reincorporate abroad,
84
 the concept of inversion has been controversial 
since these transactions began taking place in the 1980s.
85
 As inversions 
have recently become more commonplace,
86
 and in light of the 2008 
economic downturn,
87
 scrutiny of the practice has increased.
88
 For some 
people, the notion of successful corporations “deserting” America is 
unconscionable,
89
 and with strong opinions on both sides of the debate, 
corporate tax inversions have become one of the most polarizing tax 
policy issues today.
90
 President Obama has taken a firm anti-inversion 
 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. The anticipated tax benefits include a reduction of US tax on foreign income by switching to 
a country with a territorial tax system and a reduction of US tax on US income by employing strategies 
such as earnings stripping. See Kirsch, supra note 26, at 489–96. 
 82. Corporate tax inversions have been called “immoral,” “wrong,” “contemptible,” and 
“unpatriotic tax dodge[s].” Sheppard, supra note 27, at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
White House calls inverters “corporate deserters.” Randle, supra note 56. But see Zachary Warmbrodt 
& Jon Prior, James Downplays Tax Inversions, POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2014/09/tony-james-corporate-tax-inversion-110749, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
7Q7T-FBLT (“A major Wall Street backer of . . . Obama . . . said corporate tax inversions sound 
‘scary’ and seem ‘un-American’ but will not have a big economic impact on the United States. . . . 
‘This is one where the emotion and the noise and the rhetoric is wildly bigger than the issue 
economically . . . .’”). This is because “firms are not moving people out of the country, they pay full 
income taxes on U.S. income and such a move triggers upfront tax payments.” Warmbrodt & Prior, 
supra. 
 83. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 86. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 87. See generally Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the 
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5 (2009) (providing helpful background on the financial 
crisis). 
 88. See Kun, supra note 26, at 314 (“Corporate inversions became a noticeable phenomenon 
between 1998 and 2002, when a number of large U.S.-based multinational corporations elected to 
expatriate.”). 
 89. Inversions are a “new kind of American corporate exceptionalism,” and inverters are 
“companies that have decided to desert our country to avoid paying taxes but expect to keep receiving 
the full array of benefits that being American confers, and that everyone else is paying for.” Sloan, 
supra note 54. 
 90. See Regnier, supra note 26 (“Everybody on the Hill says inversions are just a symptom of a 
messed up tax code. The trouble is Republicans and Democrats are sharply divided on how to fix it.”). 
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position, and his administration has sought to limit these transactions as 
much as possible.
91
 The President asserts that inverters are not being fair to 
their domestic competitors or the proverbial “hard-working American 
taxpayer.”92 Obama’s 2015 budget included a plan to lessen the incentives 
for corporations to invert and to make the transaction more difficult to 
accomplish.
93
 With so much at stake in terms of tax revenue
94
 and 
America’s ability to attract and retain prosperous businesses,95 the 
President has understandably chosen to focus his attention on the 
interrelated problems of necessary corporate tax reform and the resulting 
increase in inversions.
96
 
Opponents of inversions make several arguments to justify increasing 
governmental regulation. In addition to the above-mentioned loss of 
significant tax revenue,
97
 some critics posit that inversions undermine 
public confidence in the US tax system because “the big guys” avoid taxes 
and leave everyone else to make up the difference.
98
 Successful inversions 
also encourage other US corporations to expatriate in order to remain 
competitive, so that the problem actually compounds itself.
99
 Critics also 
raise corporate governance concerns,
100
 speculating that shareholder rights 
may be impinged when corporations relocate to less-developed 
economies,
101
 especially if shareholders are not afforded the same 
 
 
 91. Randle, supra note 56 (“[T]he Obama administration is looking at possible options to 
respond to the problem of ‘corporate deserters.’”). 
 92. Id. (alteration in original) (“‘[These large companies] don’t want to give up the best 
universities and the best military and all the advantages of operating in the United States. They just 
don’t want to pay for it,’ said the president.”). 
 93. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces First Steps to Reduce Tax 
Benefits of Corporate Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2647.aspx. 
 94. “Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation projects that failing to limit inversions will cost the 
Treasury an additional $19.5 billion over 10 years . . . .” Sloan, supra note 54. 
 95. Limiting the ability of corporations to invert may actually cause the United States to lose jobs 
to overseas competitors. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 559–60. 
 96. But cf. CLAUSING, supra note 48, at 7 (“Some policymakers[, including President Obama,] 
seem open to targeted legislation that would tackle the inversion problem without waiting for broader 
corporate tax reform.”). 
 97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 565. A “potential lack of public confidence represents a 
serious risk to the U.S. tax system, which is based on voluntary compliance.” Kun, supra note 26, at 
372. 
 99. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 563–64. 
 100. See id. at 566. 
 101. Id. Bermuda is a popular destination for inverted companies. See Kun, supra note 26, at 343. 
Moreover, Bermuda may actually provide acceptable protections for shareholders: 
The Bermuda standard [for the fiduciary duty of care] imposes a two-fold requirement . . . . 
First, officers must “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
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protections that US law provides.
102
 Furthermore, because inversions will 
generally cause stockholders to realize taxable capital gains, some argue 
that these transactions are actually economically harmful to 
stockholders.
103
 This conclusion is questioned, however, by a number of 
tax experts who consider the impact from any initial taxable capital gains 
negligible.
104
 
Opponents of inversion transactions support a number of potential 
legislative and regulatory measures that would make it more difficult for 
companies to reincorporate abroad.
105
 Suggested near-term reforms 
include redomestication of expatriated corporations, utilization of a 
“managed and controlled” test to determine corporate headquarters, refusal 
to award federal contracts to companies that have inverted, unfavorable 
tax treatment of inverters, restrictions against the listing of inverted 
companies on US securities exchanges, and reformation of § 163(j) of the 
Code with respect to earnings stripping.
106
 Those who favor a tough stance 
on inversions also advocate for the use of the “business purpose 
doctrine,”107 which looks beyond whatever nominal purpose for 
reincorporating outside the United States is offered and instead evaluates 
 
 
company.” Second, officers must “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably 
prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.” 
Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted). However, there are no shareholder derivative actions in Bermuda, so 
shareholders lack that vehicle to protect themselves. Id. at 349–50. 
 102. “Most . . . inverting corporations were initially incorporated in Delaware.” Kun, supra note 
26, at 345. 
 103. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 560. However, the fact that corporations are subject to 
adverse tax consequences if they invert, but choose to reincorporate abroad anyway, indicates that any 
negative tax consequences should be outweighed by the benefits they expect to realize by inverting. 
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax 
Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
jl2645.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Fact Sheet]. 
 104. Thinking that initial capital gains taxes paid by stockholders are harmful to those 
stockholders is a flawed conclusion because stockholders have an interest in making the corporation as 
profitable as possible. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 560. Additionally, a large amount of stock is 
held by tax-exempt or tax-indifferent entities like pensions or mutual funds. Id. at 557. The 
disincentive provided by the prospect of paying taxes on capital gains is significantly reduced when 
the market is down and shareholders will realize few, if any, gains. See Kelly, supra note 66, at 205. 
Furthermore, the “‘exchangeable share technique’ may postpone the shareholder-level tax.” Kun, 
supra note 26, at 322. 
 105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Kelly, supra note 66, at 208–25 (detailing proposed reforms); Randle, supra note 56 
(“U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders . . . has said companies that do inversion deals should not be allowed to 
compete for federal contracts.”); see also Tootle, supra note 64, at 361 (describing “interest stripping,” 
a common earnings-stripping tactic where a US operating company pays nominally tax-deductible 
“interest payments” to its new foreign parent and deducts the payment amounts from the US source’s 
taxable income). 
 107. 26 C.F.R. § 1.368-2(g) (2016) (providing that reorganizations “must be undertaken for 
reasons germane to the continuance of the business of a corporation a party to the reorganization”). 
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the tax treatment of inverters based on whether they have legitimate 
business reasons for expatriating.
108
 While these and other proposed 
measures
109
 may have an impact on the inversion trend, some critics argue 
that most of the actions that can be taken are merely symbolic,
110
 and that 
the debate surrounding the issue is more politically significant than the 
actual economic implications of inversions.
111
 
The historical pattern of companies reincorporating abroad for tax 
purposes through creative expatriation transactions and the legislative and 
regulatory responses that invariably follow has repeated itself many times 
since the 1983 McDermott transaction.
112
 Following that transaction, 
Congress enacted § 1248(i)
113
 and § 163(j)
114
 of the Code to prevent US 
shareholders from realizing earnings at the capital gains rate through the 
liquidation of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) and to deter 
corporations from engaging in interest stripping.
115
 The 1994 Helen of 
Troy transaction
116
 was also quickly addressed by regulators, who made 
changes to § 367(a)
117
 of the Code, making transfers of stock from 
domestic corporations to foreign corporations taxable in specific 
circumstances.
118
 However, these responses
119
 did not sufficiently deter 
prospective inverters and the United States experienced a wave of 
 
 
 108. Kun, supra note 26, at 368 (“The business purpose doctrine denies tax-free reorganization 
treatment to any transaction entered into solely for the purpose of achieving a particular tax result and 
not ‘for reasons germane to the continuance of the business of a corporation [that is] a party to the 
reorganization.’”). 
 109. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 26, at 482 (discussing the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
whereby Congress imposed an “alternative sanction” under which inverted corporations were 
forbidden from contracting with the US Department of Homeland Security). 
 110. Id. at 507–20. “[M]ost citizens have only a foggy knowledge of public affairs . . . . In this 
context . . . the principal function of much legislation . . . is to provide symbolic reassurance to the 
public, while only a small group of interested, involved persons generally receives any tangible benefit 
from the legislation.” Id. at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michael S. Kirsch, 
Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as 
a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 921–22 (2004)). 
 111. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 113. I.R.C. § 1248(i) (2014). 
 114. Id. § 163(j). 
 115. See Tootle, supra note 64, at 365; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 116. “‘The 1994 Helen of Troy transaction was the first of the modern wave of outbound 
inversions and . . . [came] to be regarded as the prototypical ‘pure’ inversion transaction.’” Kun, supra 
note 26, at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting New York State Bar Assoc., Tax Section, Outbound 
Inversion Transactions, 96 TAX NOTES 127, 129 (2002)). 
 117. I.R.C. § 367(a) (2014). 
 118. “[T]ransfers of stock of domestic corporations to foreign corporations [became] taxable if, in 
the aggregate, all U.S. transferors owned 50% or more of the stock of the foreign parent by vote or by 
value immediately after the exchange.” Tootle, supra note 64, at 366. 
 119. See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
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inversions during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
120
 A number of large 
corporations inverted, including Triton Energy, Tyco, and Fruit of the 
Loom.
121
 In response to this wave of inversions, Congress passed the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
122
 which contained the most 
comprehensive anti-inversion legislation up to that point.
123
 The Act 
created § 7874 of the Code,
124
 which “seeks to eliminate most inversion 
transactions by removing all of their tax benefits,”125 rather than 
attempting to “deter inversions by imposing tax costs on the inversion 
transaction itself,” as had been the approach taken in previous attempts to 
limit the practice.
126
 Nonetheless, regulators have never been able to 
permanently halt the practice of inversions,
127
 despite these reform 
efforts.
128
 
Opponents of inversions understandably treat the continued legality of 
these transactions as a domestic policy priority with serious and lasting 
implications for the United States.
129
 Examining a recent inversion 
illuminates what is at stake behind the policy debate. Consider 
Medtronic,
130
 a multinational, Minnesota-based medical corporation that 
acquired Covidien, an Irish corporation. The transaction resulted in a 
change of Medtronic’s nominal headquarters to Ireland, a country with a 
significantly more advantageous corporate tax regime than the United 
States.
131
 Covidien was “itself a faux-Irish firm that [was] run from 
Massachusetts except for income-taxpaying purposes.”132 Medtronic, like 
many similarly-sized corporations, held a significant amount of cash 
 
 
 120. See Tootle, supra note 64, at 366–67. 
 121. Id. 
 122. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
 123. Id. § 801, 118 Stat. at 1562–66; Tootle, supra note 64, at 368. 
 124. I.R.C. § 7874 (2014). 
 125. Tootle, supra note 64, at 368 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 113–26 and accompanying text.  
 129. See generally David Brodwin, Corporate Tax Inversions Leave You with the Bill: Consumers 
and Small Business Lose When America’s Largest Companies Avoid Taxes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Aug. 1, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/08/ 
01/corporate-inversion-tax-avoidance-hurts-small-businesses-and-consumers. 
 130. MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
 131. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing Ireland’s 12.5 percent corporate tax 
rate to the United States’ 35 percent rate). As with most mergers, Medtronic is paying a premium price 
for Covidien. See Sloan, supra note 54. Medtronic is indemnifying “directors and executive officers 
for [the] excise tax [associated with ‘the value of options and restricted stock owned by top officers 
and board members of inverting companies’] because they should not be discouraged from taking 
actions that they believe are in the best interests of Medtronic and its shareholders.” Id. 
 132. Sloan, supra note 54. 
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offshore because the United States’ worldwide tax system would have 
made it very expensive to repatriate the money.
133
 Of the estimated $14 
billion held overseas by Medtronic in 2014, $3.5 billion to $4.2 billion 
likely would have needed to be paid immediately to the IRS if those 
overseas earnings were to have been brought to the United States outside 
the context of an inversion.
134
 In addition to conferring other 
advantages,
135
 its recent inversion allows Medtronic to pay dividends on 
the entirety of its cash held overseas, without first subjecting the money to 
corporate income taxation in the United States.
136
 For those opposed to 
inversions, this lost tax revenue, coupled with the notion that other 
corporate and individual taxpayers will have to make up the difference,
137
 
makes the thought of continuing to allow such transactions unpalatable.
138
 
D. An Alternative Solution: Comprehensive Corporate Tax Reform 
Fundamental opposition to inversions is not universal. Many 
economists, legislators, academics, and businesspeople do not vilify 
corporations that choose to expatriate. Instead, they consider inversions to 
be symptoms of a greater problem, not problems themselves.
139
 In light of 
the comparative disadvantages facing businesses incorporated in the 
United States,
140
 including the 35 percent corporate tax rate and worldwide 
system of taxation, many multinationals have concluded that moving 
 
 
 133. Id.; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 134. Sloan, supra note 54. $3.5 billion to $4.2 billion represents the difference between the 35 
percent US corporate tax rate and the taxes Medtronic has already paid overseas, generally at a rate of 
5 percent to 10 percent. Id. 
 135. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Sloan, supra note 54. 
 137. Of course, to the extent that other taxpayers do not make up for Medtronic’s lower tax bill 
and the government does not reduce its spending in anticipation of collecting less in revenue, 
Medtronic’s inversion could also indirectly impact the escalating national debt. See supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. See Sloan, supra note 54. Companies should “[f]ight to fix the tax code, but [shouldn’t] 
desert the country.” Id. Furthermore: 
“[F]iduciary duty” [is] the obligation to produce the best long-term results for shareholders, 
not “get the stock price up today.” Undermining the finances of the federal government by 
inverting helps undermine our economy. And that’s a bad thing, in the long run, for 
companies that do business in America. 
Id. “Inverters don’t hesitate to take advantage of the great things that make America [a land of 
opportunity] . . . . But inverters do hesitate—totally—when it’s time to ante up their fair share of 
financial support of our system.” Id. 
 139. See Pomerleau & Lundeen, supra note 41. “[T]he U.S.’s tax code has fallen behind 
significantly, but the U.S. can take a couple of important steps to catch up.” Id.; see also supra note 90 
and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 21–27, 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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abroad is necessary to remain competitive.
141
 As such, a company that opts 
to invert can be compared to a person who chooses “flight” in a “fight or 
flight” scenario.142 Whether that choice is a smart business decision or a 
condemnable act of desertion depends largely on one’s views regarding 
the duties of a corporation,
143
 where the blame for the inversion problem 
should lie,
144
 and what a solution should look like.
145
 
It is well established in the US legal tradition that business corporations 
are “organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.”146 Defenders of inversions apply this traditional doctrine 
and argue that US businesses that choose to invert and reincorporate 
abroad are merely maximizing value for their shareholders,
147
 in 
accordance with their directors’ fiduciary duties.148 Corporations that have 
chosen to invert tend to have a number of similarities. They are generally 
larger, less leveraged, and pay more in taxes than other businesses in their 
industries.
149
 Accordingly, undergoing an inversion may simply reflect the 
pursuit of a course to ameliorate a corporation’s already significant tax 
burden, thereby increasing value, maximizing shareholder profits, and 
satisfying directors’ fiduciary obligations.150 Under such a construction, it 
 
 
 141. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 551–52. 
 143. This duty could be seen as merely running to shareholders, thereby obligating the corporation 
to maximize its value, or it could be construed more broadly, such that it runs to all stakeholders, 
including the US public at large. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
 144. Opponents of inversions generally place the blame on the corporations that choose to 
expatriate. See supra notes 85–104 and accompanying text. On the other hand, proponents of tax 
reform are inclined to argue that the blame lies with the White House and Congress, which have failed 
to pass needed comprehensive corporate tax reform. See infra notes 152–74 and accompanying text. 
 145. “The GOP wants to move away from the worldwide tax system to a ‘territorial’ one . . . . 
Democrats have generally opposed this, preferring to impose new rules . . . .” Regnier, supra note 26. 
 146. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). “The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself . . . .” Id.; see also eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that the implementation of 
corporate policy that “specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value 
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” is impermissible). 
 147. Inverting is a strategic decision, arguably no different from choosing to incorporate in 
Delaware. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 562. 
 148. “[Former President] Clinton said that publicly traded companies, in particular, ‘feel duty 
bound to pay the lowest taxes they can pay.’” Hayward, supra note 44. 
 149. See Kun, supra note 26, at 318–19. 
 150. Maximizing profits for shareholders in the short term can become a director’s primary duty 
in particular situations, such as when a merger or other sale of the company becomes imminent, as 
may be the case in some inversions. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that the board’s duty “changed from the preservation of Revlon as 
a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”); 
see also Colin Campbell, Bill Clinton: Executives Think the US Tax Code Is ‘Crazy’, BUS. INSIDER 
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is easy to see why so many corporations have chosen to invert over the 
past several decades.
151
 
For those who are sympathetic toward these businesses, reform efforts 
should be directed toward addressing the underlying problem that creates 
the incentive for inversions: the US corporate tax scheme.
152
 Rather than 
attempting to block each new method by which a corporation can invert, 
ex post,
153
 and hoping that the route taken by a given corporation will be 
closed to those that would follow it, policymakers should reform the Code 
to make the United States more competitive on the global stage.
154
 
Proponents of this philosophy argue that lawmakers and regulators will 
perpetually be a step behind the innovative businesspeople and lawyers 
who inevitably seem to find creative new ways to accomplish the 
transaction in an evolving regulatory landscape.
155
 Proponents of tax 
reform argue that instead of continuing to waste effort and resources in an 
ideological clash, which regulators would struggle to ever truly “win,”156 
the government should put away its “stick” and should try using the 
“carrot” to attract businesses and the talent, tax revenue, and innovation 
they bring to America.
157
 
 
 
(Sept. 23, 2014, 12:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-clinton-executives-think-the-us-tax-
code-is-crazy-2014-9, archived at https://perma.cc/MH7L-A93K. When asked if inverted companies 
were “unpatriotic,” Bill Clinton was evasive in saying “[w]hether [they are] or not, companies . . . 
have a short-term perspective.” Id. 
 151. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 152. Randle, supra note 56 (“Some Republicans and former U.S. President Bill Clinton say the 
inversion deals are a symptom of the larger problem, which requires comprehensive tax reform to 
resolve.”). But see Kirsch, supra note 26, at 502–03 (noting that opponents of this view argue that 
portraying the problem as related to worldwide taxation is merely a red herring meant to distract from 
earnings stripping). 
 153. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
 154. Bill Thomas, the former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, opined that he 
was less inclined to prohibit corporations from inverting than he was to “treat [inversions] as a 
symptom, examine the underlying disease[,] . . . the tax code and [its] failure to be even minimally 
useful to [businesses,] and deal with the fact that the U.S. is out of sync with the rest of the world.”  
Kirsch, supra note 26, at 500–01. 
 155. See supra notes 113–27 and accompanying text. 
 156. Historical precedent for regulation following major inversions, but failing to “win” by 
reversing the trend completely, can be observed from the 1983 McDermott transaction through the 
present. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Kirsch, supra note 26, at 501 (noting that Chairman Thomas argued: “We are not well 
equipped to deal with trade in the 21st century; we have to change our tax code.”); cf. Randle, supra 
note 56 (suggesting that major corporate tax reform probably would not happen until 2015 at the 
earliest, so the President would likely use executive actions to make inversions more difficult in the 
meantime, likely with limited success). But see Sloan, supra note 54 (emphasis added) (proffering the 
views of John Buckley, a former Democratic tax attorney, who stated that the inversion trend is not 
occurring because there is no prospect for corporate tax reform, but rather “because there is a prospect 
of reform. If reform comes, [Buckley] says, there will be winners and losers—and it’s the likely losers-
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For those who see inversions as merely an indicator of greater 
problems rooted in the US corporate tax system, there are several 
proactive changes that could be made to the Code,
158
 in lieu of 
perpetuating the pattern of reactive regulations following every major 
inversion transaction.
159
 Significantly, reformers seek a change from the 
country’s current worldwide tax regime to a territorial system, which 
would bring the United States into conformity with the majority of 
developed countries around the globe.
160
 Additionally, reformers want the 
United States to lower its corporate income tax rate to bring it closer to 
prevailing rates elsewhere in the world.
161
 While these two reforms would 
likely achieve the most in terms of removing incentives for corporations to 
expatriate,
162
 pragmatists have also proposed several other approaches to 
reforming the US corporate tax regime and reducing the number of 
inversion transactions it encourages.
163
 
These approaches include allowing self-help territoriality,
164
 pressuring 
other countries to change their tax laws,
165
 addressing multiple tax 
 
 
to-be that are inverting. ‘Even minimal tax reform would hurt a lot of these companies badly,’ he 
says.”). 
 158. See infra notes 160–70 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 567–71. Sheppard identifies several flaws with this solution, 
including that the timing may not be right for such a change, that it could actually enhance tax 
avoidance by legitimizing moving operations offshore, that implementation of a territorial system 
would take too long, that the loss of revenue from inversions is slight compared with the cost 
associated with changing the Code, that a territorial system may not be the best approach, and that a 
change to a territorial system has already been met with significant legislative resistance. Id. But see 
supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (outlining the higher costs imposed on corporate taxpayers 
under the United States’ worldwide taxation system relative to the costs imposed on taxpayers under a 
territorial system). 
 161. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 571–72. The US rate of 35 percent is significantly out of 
sync with the rates of other OECD countries, including Canada, which has rates between 11 percent 
and 15 percent, and Ireland, which has a corporate tax rate of about 12.5 percent. See supra notes 41–
42 and accompanying text. 
 162. See generally PHILIP DITTMER, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
TERRITORIAL TAXATION 1 (2012), available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/global-perspective-
territorial-taxation (arguing that the United States’ decision to employ “the highest top marginal tax 
rate in the developed world,” in addition to its being one of only a few countries that still maintains a 
worldwide system of corporate taxation, has become “exceptionally burdensome” for US businesses). 
 163. See infra notes 164–70 and accompanying text. 
 164. Governmental inaction will allow corporations to “proceed to legally invert, thereby opting to 
take advantage of self-help territoriality.” Sheppard, supra note 27, at 572. 
 165. “Perhaps the most outlandish proposal to halt inversions was offered by Senator Max Baucus 
. . . who suggested that the United States might pressure ‘the Bermudas of the world’ so that they ‘stop 
this.’” Id. at 573. “While the United States is no stranger to applying economic sanctions or enlisting 
the assistance of its political and/or economic allies in times of need, the idea that the United States 
can unilaterally obligate Bermuda to relinquish its sovereign right[s] . . . smacks of excessive hubris.” 
Id. 
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problems simultaneously,
166
 redomestication effected by new rules for 
corporate residency,
167
 or simply disregarding attempted inversions.
168
 
Reformers also consider more comprehensive approaches
169
 and other, less 
orthodox solutions.
170
 Ultimately, while there may be disagreement about 
the appropriate means by which to achieve the desired end,
171
 reformers 
urge that the focus should not be on corporations that have legally 
expatriated in the past.
172
 Instead, they assert that efforts should be 
centered on modernizing the US tax system so that multinationals will 
view the United States as a “model country in which to organize, manage 
and operate.”173 Reformers insist that if this can be achieved, the 
incentives for corporations to invert will be eliminated and positive 
changes will follow for the nation as a whole.
174
 
III. SEPTEMBER 2014 TREASURY NOTICE 
On September 22, 2014, the Department of the Treasury announced its 
latest effort to stymie inversions in I.R.S. Notice 2014-52
175
 (the 
“Notice”), which addresses changes to how the transactions will be 
treated. In the Notice, officials describe regulatory changes under five 
sections of the Code, hoping to make inversions more difficult to complete 
 
 
 166. Corporate tax inversions could be addressed simultaneously with other international tax 
issues, including tax shelters and the overall competitiveness of the United States’ international 
corporate tax regime. Id. at 574; see also generally Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax 
Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2010) (discussing the “capital neutrality paradox” as it 
applies to the existence of tax havens). 
 167. Sheppard, supra note 27, at 578 (footnote omitted) (“As a way to discourage inversions, 
some experts suggest scrapping the existing place-of-residency rules and replacing them with a 
management-and-control test. Under this new standard, the legal residency of [a] corporation would be 
based on where the decision-makers . . . are located, as opposed to where the parent corporation is 
legally organized.”). 
 168. Id. at 579–81. 
 169. See id. at 581–83. 
 170. Suggested unorthodox approaches include prohibiting inverted corporations from being 
awarded government contracts; potentially exposing executives of inverting corporations to criminal 
charges, as well as exerting “various forms of economic and market pressure,” including the 
encouragement of public boycotts of corporations that have expatriated; and running advertisements to 
educate the public about inversions. Id. at 583–85. 
 171. See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text. 
 172. Sheppard, supra note 27, at 588. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. In addition to slowing or entirely halting the pace of inversions, major tax reform 
would likely have the effect of broadening the corporate tax base, thereby increasing revenues and 
decreasing the rate of growth of the national deficit.  
 175. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. 
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and less profitable moving forward.
176
 Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew 
proclaimed that “[i]nversion transactions erode our corporate tax base, 
unfairly placing a larger burden on all other taxpayers, including small 
businesses and hard-working Americans . . . . It’s critical that this unfair 
loophole be closed.”177 The Notice was effective immediately and applied 
to all deals that were not already completed.
178
 Secretary Lew expressed 
his desire that Treasury’s actions would make inversions economically 
unviable, at least for some companies considering them.
179
 
A. Targeting “Hopscotch” Loans: § 956(e) 
One of the provisions addressed in detail by the Notice is § 956(e)
180
 of 
Subpart F of the Code.
181
 The purpose of § 956 is to prevent US 
shareholders of CFCs from deferring payment of US taxes by delaying the 
repatriation of income earned abroad.
182
 Following an inversion, an 
expatriated foreign subsidiary can no longer be considered a CFC, a tactic 
that formerly allowed the avoidance of US taxes, even on earnings and 
profits that predated the transaction.
183
 American-owned multinationals are 
required, however, to pay taxes on income earned by their CFCs when that 
money is repatriated back into the United States.
184
 If a CFC attempts to 
circumvent this tax by investing in US property, the Code considers the 
domestic parent to have received a taxable dividend from its subsidiary.
185
 
Addressing § 956(e) of the Code, the Notice specifically targets so-called 
“hopscotch” loans, a common tool used by inverters to avoid this 
unfavorable tax construction.
186
 
 
 
 176. John D. McKinnon & Damian Paletta, Obama Administration Issues New Rules to Combat 
Tax Inversions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-to-
unveil-measures-to-combat-tax-inversions-1411421056. 
 177. Tom Huddleston, Jr., Obama Administration Releases New Rules to Fight Tax Inversions, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2014, 6:48 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/22/obama-administration-releases-
new-rules-to-fight-tax-inversions/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 176. 
 179. See Hayward, supra note 44. “Today, Treasury is taking action to reduce the tax benefits 
of—and when possible, stop—corporate tax inversions.” Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
 180. I.R.C. § 956(e) (2014). 
 181. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 712. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Mike Patton, Will U.S. Government Succeed in Closing This Corporate Tax Loophole?, 
FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/09/25/congress-
attempts-to-close-corporate-tax-loophole/. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
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Prior to the Notice, inverted companies were able to bypass the rule 
that reclassifies CFC investments in US property if a CFC made a loan to 
the newly created foreign parent, rather than the US parent.
187
 Such 
hopscotch loans
188
 were not regarded as US property and were not taxed as 
dividend payments.
189
 The Notice’s changes to the implementation of 
§ 956(e) remove the benefit of these loans by simply treating them as US 
property for purposes of the anti-avoidance rule.
190
 The same tax rules 
now apply whether the CFC issues the loan to the US parent before the 
inversion or to the newly created foreign parent afterward.
191
 
The Notice also provides that, for purposes of § 956, any stock or other 
obligation of a foreign related person will be treated as US property to the 
extent that it is acquired by a foreign subsidiary following expatriation.
192
 
A “foreign related person” is defined under § 7874(d)(3) and, for purposes 
of the new regulations, does not include expatriated foreign subsidiaries.
193
 
The Obama administration and the Department of the Treasury hope that 
effecting this change will prevent corporations from utilizing hopscotch 
loans to avoid paying US taxes on income earned abroad.
194
 
B. Scrutinizing the Reorganization of Foreign Subsidiaries: § 7701(l) 
Following an inversion, some US multinationals avoid paying US taxes 
on deferred earnings by their CFCs when the new foreign parent purchases 
enough stock in the CFC to take control away from the prior US parent.
195
 
Such a “‘de-controlling’ strategy” allows the new foreign parent to use the 
deferred earnings without paying US tax on the income.
196
 Section 7701(l) 
 
 
 187. See Patton, supra note 184. 
 188. “An inversion transaction may permit the top corporate parent in the newly inverted group, a 
group still principally comprised of U.S. shareholders and their CFCs, to avoid section 956 by 
accessing the untaxed earnings and profits of the CFCs without a current tax [on] the U.S. 
shareholders.” I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 717. This would be impossible, but for the 
inversion. Id. “The ability of the new foreign parent to access deferred CFC earnings and profits would 
in many cases eliminate the need for . . . CFCs to pay dividends to the U.S. shareholders, thereby 
circumventing the purposes of section 956.” Id. 
 189. See Patton, supra note 184. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. “[S]olely for purposes of Code Sec. 956, any 
obligation or stock of a foreign related person . . . will be treated as U.S. property within the meaning 
of Code Sec. 956(c)(1) to the extent such obligation or stock is acquired by an expatriated foreign 
subsidiary during the applicable period.” Forthcoming Regs, supra note 69. 
 192. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 717. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See supra notes 175–93 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103; see also Patton, supra note 184. 
 196. Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
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of the Code provides that “[t]he Secretary may prescribe regulations 
recharacterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction 
directly among any 2 or more of such parties where the Secretary 
determines that such recharacterization is appropriate to prevent avoidance 
of any tax imposed by [the Code].”197 
In light of the Notice, a newly created foreign parent “would be treated 
[under § 7701(l)] as owning stock in the former U.S. parent, rather than 
the CFC, to remove the benefits of the ‘de-controlling’ strategy.”198 The 
Notice’s changes to the construction of § 7701(l) should facilitate the 
recharacterization of transactions that formerly permitted the avoidance of 
US taxes on an expatriated foreign subsidiary’s profits from before its 
inversion.
199
 This recharacterization will allow the United States to 
recapture some taxable income from inverted corporations and therefore 
serves as a disincentive for companies considering an inversion.
200
 
Accordingly, the changes implemented under § 7701(l) should reduce the 
tax benefits of a strictly “paper” inversion transaction.201 
C. Preventing Tax Avoidance by Reclassifying Stock Sales to CFCs: 
§ 304(b) 
The Notice also describes forthcoming regulations applying to 
§ 304(b)
202
 of the Code. The changes related to this section close a 
loophole by prohibiting inverted corporations from transferring money or 
other property from a CFC to a newly created foreign parent in a 
maneuver that previously enabled a complete avoidance of US taxes.
203
 
Prior to these changes, a new foreign parent would sell its stock in the 
former US parent to a CFC holding deferred earnings, effectively 
producing a tax-free repatriation of cash through the circumvention of the 
original US parent.
204
 Following the Notice, such transactions are 
 
 
 197. I.R.C. § 7701(l) (2014). 
 198. Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
 199. See Forthcoming Regs, supra note 69. 
 200. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 719. 
 201. See id. 
 202. I.R.C. § 304(b) (2014). 
 203. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
 204. See id. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) states that if: 
[O]ne or more persons are in control of each of two corporations, and . . . in return for 
property, one of the corporations acquires stock in the other . . . from the person . . . so in 
control, then . . . such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption . . . of the 
corporation acquiring such stock. 
I.R.C. § 304(a)(1)(A)–(B). The new regulations under § 304 are effected to prevent the removal of 
untaxed foreign earnings and profits from CFCs. See Forthcoming Regs, supra note 69. 
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disallowed for the sake of applying § 304(b)(5)(B), because for the 
determination of the taxability of § 304(b)(2) dividends, the IRS now only 
considers the earnings and profits of the acquiring corporation, rather than 
the issuing corporation.
205
 
The transactions with which the changes related to § 304 are primarily 
concerned are those where earnings of a CFC are artificially reduced to 
facilitate the repatriation of cash or other property held by the CFC, 
without paying the normal US taxes.
206
 In response to such tax-avoiding 
transactions, and pursuant to the Notice, Treasury will determine, for the 
purposes of § 304(b)(5)(B), whether at least 50 percent of the dividends 
arising under § 304(b)(2) are subject to US corporate income tax based 
solely on the income of the acquiring corporation.
207
 Regulators hope these 
changes will reduce the erosion of the US corporate income tax base 
caused by inversion transactions and that they will provide a disincentive 
for companies considering inversion.
208
 
D. Reducing Inversion Gains Through Consideration of Ownership 
Stakes, “Spinversions,” and Deemed Dividends: § 7874 and § 367 
In response to an increasing trend of domestic entities distributing 
property to their prior shareholders or partners in order to dilute an 
ownership stake,
209
 the Notice announces additional regulatory reforms 
under § 7874
210
 and § 367
211
 of the Code.
212
 Section 7874(a)(1) provides 
that “[t]he taxable income of an expatriated entity for any taxable year 
which includes any portion of the applicable period shall in no event be 
less than the inversion gain of the entity for the taxable year.”213 Treasury 
and the IRS are cognizant that some taxpayers have been transacting with 
foreign corporations that possess reserves of liquid assets in order to invert 
 
 
 205. See Forthcoming Regs, supra note 69. 
 206. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 722 (“For example, after an inversion 
transaction, the foreign acquiring corporation may sell a portion of the stock of the domestic 
corporation acquired in the inversion transaction to a wholly owned CFC of the domestic corporation 
in exchange for property of the CFC.”). 
 207. Id.; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
 209. Ownership stake may be calculated through application of an ownership fraction. Reducing 
the numerator of that fraction—a result achieved by corporations using this tactic—serves to dilute 
one’s share of ownership. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 712–13, 719. 
 210. I.R.C. § 7874 (2014). 
 211. I.R.C. § 367 (2014). 
 212. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, supra note 175, at 712–21. 
 213. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(1). 
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and avoid the effect of § 7874.
214
 In order to halt this tax-avoiding 
behavior, the September 2014 Treasury Notice takes several steps to make 
these transactions more difficult to accomplish.
215
 These additional 
barriers include a requirement that US shareholders in an inverted firm 
own less than 80 percent of the new entity,
216
 a limitation on the usage of 
passive assets
217
 to evade this 80 percent rule,
218
 and steps to prevent 
evasion of the rules by way of very large dividends prior to an 
inversion.
219
 
Another practice that has drawn the ire of Treasury is a type of 
transaction known as a “spinversion.”220 In these transactions, a US 
company essentially inverts a share of its operations by transferring assets 
to a newly spawned foreign corporation, after which that foreign 
corporation is “spun off” to the US company’s public shareholders.221 The 
Notice removes the tax benefit of these transactions because the spun-off 
company is treated as a domestic corporation.
222
 The changes to the 
 
 
 214. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 713. 
 215. See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. “‘We’ve recently seen a few large corporations 
announce plans to exploit this loophole, undercutting businesses that act responsibly and leaving the 
middle class to pay the bill, and I’m glad that [Treasury Secretary Jack Lew] is exploring additional 
actions to help reverse this trend,’ the president said in a statement.” Obama Announces US 
Crackdown on Inversion Tax ‘Loophole,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/business-29320029, archived at https://perma.cc/6CYL-UDK6 (alteration in original). 
 217. “[I]n some inversion transactions, the foreign acquirer’s size is inflated by passive assets, 
also known as ‘cash boxes,’ such as cash or marketable securities. These assets are not used by the 
entity for daily business functions.” Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
 218. Passive assets can only account for up to 50 percent of the foreign corporation’s assets. See 
id. This requirement does not apply to banks and other financial institutions. Id. In response to tax 
avoidance by inverting corporations, § 1.7874-1 provides a pair of exceptions to the Code: “the 
internal group restructuring exception and the loss of control exception.” I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-
42 I.R.B. 712, 715. “When either of these exceptions applies, stock of the foreign acquiring 
corporation held by members of the [expanded affiliate group] is excluded from the numerator but not 
the denominator of the ownership fraction.” Id. Forthcoming regulations will appear under 
§ 7874(c)(6) and provide that if greater than half of the gross value of all “foreign group property” is 
nonqualified, then a certain amount of the stock in the acquiring corporation will be withheld from the 
denominator when calculating ownership. Id. at 713. This analysis is to be performed after the 
acquisition and all related transactions are completed. Id. 
 219. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. Such dividends used to reduce an ownership 
fraction are known as “skinny-down” dividends. Id. The Notice “would disregard these pre-inversion 
extraordinary dividends for purposes of the ownership requirement, thereby raising the U.S. entity’s 
ownership, possibly above the 80 percent threshold.” Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (“This [type of] transaction takes advantage of a rule that was intended to permit purely 
internal restructurings by multinationals.”). 
 222. Id. (“Under [the September 2014] action[s], the spun-off foreign corporation would not 
benefit from these internal restructuring rules with the result that the spun off company would be 
treated as a domestic corporation, eliminating the use of this technique for these transactions.”). 
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implementation of § 7874 are therefore designed to recapture lost tax 
revenue and to make inversions less appealing for corporations that 
consider them in the future.
223
 
Related to the changes in the construction of § 7874, the Notice also 
details a forthcoming modification to the regulatory interpretation of 
§ 367
224
 that will further curtail a corporation’s ability to invert.225 Section 
367(a)(1) provides generally that “[i]f . . . a United States person transfers 
property to a foreign corporation, such foreign corporation shall not, for 
purposes of determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized on 
such transfer, be considered to be a corporation.”226 Furthermore, 
§ 367(b)(1) specifies: 
In the case of [certain types of exchanges] in connection with which 
there is no transfer of property described in subsection (a)(1), a 
foreign corporation shall be considered to be a corporation except to 
the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary which 
are necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of Federal 
income taxes.
227
 
The IRS was concerned that inverting corporations were abusing § 367 to 
avoid paying income taxes when domestic entities would disburse 
property to prior shareholders, therefore lowering the numerator in the 
ownership fraction used as a threshold for tax eligibility.
228
 In response to 
these abuses, Treasury has given notice of its intent to amend § 367(b) so 
that exchanging shareholders, as defined in § 1.367(b)-4(b)(1)(i)(A),
229
 
will be required to count such above-mentioned disbursements of assets as 
a deemed dividend that qualifies as income for income tax purposes, 
regardless of whether the conditions in § 1.367(b)-4(b)(1)(i)(B) have been 
met.
230
 The Obama administration and the IRS hope that this change, 
along with the other measures implemented by the Notice,
231
 will deter 
corporations from inverting and will make it less profitable for those 
which do so nonetheless.
232
 
 
 
 223. See id. 
 224. I.R.C. § 367 (2014). 
 225. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 720. 
 226. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1). 
 227. Id. § 367(b)(1). 
 228. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 718–20. 
 229. 26 C.F.R. § 1.367(b)-4(b)(1)(i)(B) (2016). 
 230. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 720. 
 231. See supra notes 175–230 and accompanying text. 
 232. See McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 176. 
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IV. CRITICAL RESPONSE TO REGULATORY LIMITATION OF INVERSIONS 
A. Reaction to the September 2014 Treasury Notice 
Lawmakers hope that Treasury’s recent efforts will serve as a 
disincentive for prospective inverters, even if the Notice is best understood 
as an interim measure in anticipation of more comprehensive reforms in 
the future.
233
 Any idea that the Notice provides an “ultimate solution” to 
the perceived inversion problem would be met with warranted skepticism, 
considering this shift in policy within the historical context of 
governmental regulation of inversions.
234
 However, despite sentiment that 
the Notice falls short of heralding the demise of inversions, the stock 
markets reflected an immediate investor response. One day after the 
September 2014 changes were announced, AstraZeneca stock fell 4.5 
percent, Shire declined 1.7 percent, and Pfizer was down 0.7 percent.
235
 
Each of those corporations was involved in a pending inversion deal.
236
 
Furthermore, the Notice affected a number of deals that were pending in 
September 2014, including Medtronics’ acquisition of Covidien, Salix 
Pharmaceuticals’ acquisition of Cosmo Pharmaceuticals, Mylan’s 
acquisition of part of Abbott Laboratories’ business, and the merger of 
Chiquita with Fyffes.
237
 
Treasury officials, who had previously projected about thirty new 
inversions in the last quarter of 2014, hoped that companies would 
consider the new rules, reexamine the cost of inverting, and ultimately 
decide that the transaction no longer made business sense.
238
 Responses by 
politicians have predictably followed party lines, with Democrats lauding 
 
 
 233. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 103. “Mr. Lew was the first to admit . . . the new actions 
are in no way a substitute for a broader reform of the U.S. corporate tax code. They are, at most, a 
short-term fix for one specific manifestation of the code’s overall inefficiency.” Editorial Board, Mr. 
Obama’s Action Against Corporate Tax ‘Inversions’ Just a Short-Term Fix, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-obamas-action-against-corporate-tax-inversions-
are-just-a-short-term-fix/2014/09/23/84ff2416-4359-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html. 
 234. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
 235. Steve Schaefer, AstraZeneca Hurt as Obama Tries to Get Tough on Tax Inversions, FORBES 
(Sept. 23, 2014, 10:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/09/23/astrazeneca-hurt-
as-obama-tries-to-get-tough-on-tax-inversions/. “Those declines may be overdoing it though. Citi 
analyst Andrew Baum suggested . . . that the measures . . . ‘do little to negatively impact the economic 
benefit’ of a proposed Pfizer/AstraZeneca tie-up, as Pfizer could drop its tax rate from 28% to 22% 
even without using the so-called ‘hopscotch’ loans . . . . ” Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 176. The Burger King deal may not be affected. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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the efforts of Treasury and Republicans expressing skepticism.
239
 
However, some experts have questioned the extent to which Treasury can 
further limit inversions. They speculate that legal challenges to the Notice 
could be possible and that enterprising firms will inevitably still find ways 
to circumvent the restrictions.
240
 Furthermore, if the Obama 
administration’s anti-inversion plan is effective, the cause for tax reform 
may, ironically, be set back.
241
 For voters, little can demonstrate the need 
to modernize corporate tax laws better than observations of US firms 
expatriating to reduce their tax burden after years of benefiting from 
strong US infrastructure.
242
 Therefore, if the Notice is as successful in 
blocking inversions as Obama hopes it will be, the call for larger corporate 
tax reform may lose momentum.
243
 
In the months following the publication of the Notice, there have been 
signs that industry is feeling the changes, but the new rules have, as 
expected, failed to completely reverse the inversion trend.
244
 The 
Medtronic-Covidien deal
245
 that was pending prior to the release of the 
Notice provides an example. Many thought that Medtronic would try to 
renegotiate its $42.9 billion bid.
246
 However, after making adjustments to 
compensate for the new rules, the deal closed in late January 2015.
247
 In 
 
 
 239. See id. (“Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) said the new policy 
‘reinforces the urgency for action before this growing wave of inversions erodes our nation’s tax base’ 
and suggested he would continue trying to pursue legislation to ban the practice. House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman David Camp (R., Mich.) had a more barbed response. ‘A few campaign 
style speeches and stopgap measures from Treasury won’t do it,’ he said. ‘It hasn’t worked in the 
past.’ He didn’t, however, recommend the Obama administration scrap the new rules.”). 
 240. See id.; Editorial Board, supra note 233 (“Tax-law experts generally agree that Treasury’s 
moves amount to an aggressive use of its existing legal authorities, not an illegitimate overextension of 
them, though that assessment may be tested in court.”). 
 241. Editorial Board, supra note 233. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. “Yet if there is room for post-election agreement between Republicans and Democrats 
on any economic issue, it could be an overhaul of the loophole-ridden system of business taxation, the 
broad principles of which are recognized by leaders of both parties.” Id.  
 244. See supra notes 130–36, 235–37 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text. 
 246. “The new rules make it more expensive for Medtronic to buy Covidien, by potentially 
requiring it to take out a loan instead of using cash held abroad, according to the people familiar with 
the matter and a Reuters analysis of the contract.” Soyoung Kim, New U.S. Tax Rules May Lead 
Medtronic to Redo Inversion Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-tax-inversion-medtronic-idUSKCN0HL2G920140926, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
M84N-V37G. In light of the new rules, Covidien might have been asked to accept a reduced price or 
to receive more stock and less cash. Id. However, Covidien retains leverage because of a large 
“breakup fee,” should Medtronic renege on the deal. Id. 
 247. Press Release, Medtronic, Medtronic Completes Acquisition of Covidien (Jan. 26, 2015), 
available at http://newsroom.medtronic.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251324&p=irol-newsArticle&ID= 
2010595, archived at https://perma.cc/X3KZ-3N39. 
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fact, in anticipation of the deal with Medtronic, Covidien’s earnings 
increased 28 percent on sales growth in its primary business segment.
248
 
Despite the Notice, this major inversion deal was ultimately consummated, 
although Medtronic was required to raise an additional $16 billion in debt 
financing in light of the new rules.
249
 
Shortly after Treasury released the Notice, industry began commenting 
on the perceived effectiveness of the changes to the interpretation of 
various sections of the Code and on the possibility of circumventing the 
latest prohibitions.
250
 The changes in the implementation of § 956(e), 
designed to prevent the use of hopscotch loans, will not even affect all 
inversion deals. For example, according to Citi analyst Andrew Baum, the 
inversion deal between Pfizer and AstraZeneca that was proposed in 2014 
could have still transpired without use of the now-forbidden loans.
251
 
Furthermore, some have speculated that Treasury’s revised interpretation 
of § 956(e) can be avoided altogether. Sam Lichtman, a Tax partner at 
Haynes and Boone, LLP in New York, theorized that companies could 
avoid the rule by having a foreign subsidiary holding substantial cash give 
an advance to an affiliate corporation in a lower-tax jurisdiction for inter-
company goods or intellectual property under certain types of contracts.
252
 
Under such a transaction, these advance payments may not be treated as 
creating an “obligation” for the parent, which would allow for a tax 
advantage if the corporation were to undergo a subsequent inversion.
253
 
 
 
 248. Angela Chen, Covidien Earnings Rise on Growth in Surgical Sales, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 
2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/covidien-earnings-rise-on-growth-in-surgical-sales-
1421937034. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See infra notes 251–63 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Schaefer, supra note 235 (“U.S. cash flow of the combined Pfizer/AstraZeneca would 
still be sufficient—along with Pfizer’s usual debt financing—to cover the approximately $4.5 billion 
in dividends the company would pay.”). After Pfizer’s deal with AstraZeneca fell apart, the 
pharmaceutical giant proceeded to announce what would have been the largest inversion deal in 
history: a $160 billion merger with Allergan. See Portia Crowe, The Largest Takeover of the Year Is 
All About Avoiding US Taxes, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 23, 2015, 10:03 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/pfizer-allergan-deal-tax-inversion-2015-10. Pfizer’s deal with Allergan was called off, 
however, after Treasury released even more stringent anti-inversion regulations in April 2016. See 
Renae Merle & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Pfizer, Allergan Call Off $160 Billion Merger After U.S. Moves 
to Block Inversions, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/pfizer-allergan-call-off-160-billion-merger-after-us-moves-to-block-inversions/2016/04/06/ 
4fd55446-fc11-11e5-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html. The April 2016 regulations are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 252. See Patton, supra note 184. 
 253. See id. “Absent an inversion, these advance payments by the foreign subsidiary would be 
includible in income for U.S. tax purposes regardless of whether the payment is structured as a loan or 
deposit (giving rise to a deemed dividend) or as a business payable (giving rise to operating income).” 
Id. (quoting Sam Lichtman). 
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Therefore, Lichtman argues that the new rules fail to entirely remove the 
tax benefits associated with hopscotch loans.
254
  
Furthermore, according to Lichtman, the changes related to § 7701(l) 
that are designed to prevent inverted corporations from gaining tax-free 
access to their foreign subsidiaries’ earnings may also be ineffective.255 He 
explains that the new rule would not apply when US shareholders use 
income from a deemed dividend as part of a de-controlling transaction.
256
 
Thus, the post-inversion earnings of a CFC would be available for a parent 
corporation without incurring US tax liability.
257
 As such, Treasury’s 
objectives under § 7701 are likewise frustrated. 
Finally, there are also questions about the effectiveness of the changes 
under § 7874 of the Code. For example, the Notice did not impact the 
well-known deal between Burger King and Tim Hortons, because Burger 
King only gained 51 percent control of the Canadian firm that survived the 
merger.
258
 This figure is comfortably within Treasury’s new 80 percent 
rule.
259
 In light of the recent Burger King deal,
260
 and with the ownership 
threshold set at only 80 percent under § 7874, the new regulations may be 
doing less than originally hoped to reduce the incentives that motivate 
corporations to invert.
261
 The long-term impact of these regulations from 
Treasury will ultimately have to be assessed after more time has passed 
and the market has had an opportunity to evaluate and respond to the rules. 
There are already several compelling reasons,
262
 however, to be skeptical 
that the Notice will function as any sort of panacea for the shortcomings of 
the US corporate tax system.
263
 
 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. “Moreover, its shareholders will only own 27 per cent of the company . . . . That alone 
already complies to [sic] the Treasury Department’s new less-than-80-per cent rule . . . .” Esther 
Tanquintic-Misa, Burger King, Tim Hortons Merger Still on Go Despite the New US Tax Rules, 
$2.25B Worth of Notes Issued to Fund Purchase, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com.au/burger-king-tim-hortons-merger-still-go-despite-new-us-tax-rules-225b-
worth-notes-issued-fund, archived at https://perma.cc/AZ79-RCX8. 
 259. Id. Treasury had considered making the threshold 50 percent, but that would have required 
congressional approval. Glenn Brock, Burger King Proceeds with Purchase of Tim Horton’s, Despite 
Changes in Tax Rules, INQUISITR (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1503885/burger-king-
proceeds-with-purchase-of-tim-hortons-despite-changes-in-tax-rules/, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
3NG7-LTWB. 
 260. “‘This deal has always been driven by long-term growth and not by tax benefits,’ the 
companies said in a joint statement.” Id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See supra notes 251–61 and accompanying text. 
 263. See generally supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
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B. General Response to Anti-Inversion Regulatory Schemes 
While the Obama administration’s September 2014 move to discourage 
corporations from inverting is motivated by a desire to shore up the US 
corporate tax base
264
 and to more equitably distribute the tax burden,
265
 
there are reasons to question whether these changes will have the desired 
effect. Although any new regulations are likely to temporarily stall 
inversions while companies take time to assess how their plans might be 
affected,
266
 history shows that additional rules tend to serve merely as 
short-term patches for larger problems with the Code.
267
 Furthermore, each 
successive round of Treasury efforts to limit inversions removes pressure 
from Congress to deal with the greater problem of the outdated US 
corporate tax structure.
268
 This is especially unfortunate considering that, 
in more than thirty years of seeking to contain inversions, congressional 
and regulatory responses have tended to fall short of their desired impact 
because Washington has failed to anticipate how industry will respond.
269
 
So far, those responses have largely circumvented lawmakers’ efforts to 
prohibit the transactions.
270
 In light of the Notice, it appears that regulators 
have succumbed to the usual pitfall, rather than partnering with businesses 
and considering a more comprehensive overhaul of the Code.
271
 
In addition to doubts about whether or not the new rules will have their 
desired effect, there are also reasons to fear that they actually provide 
businesses with some incentives that have negative implications for the 
US economy.
272
 The Notice prohibits inversions through mergers where 
US shareholders account for 80 percent or more of the combined entity, 
and the Obama administration hopes that Congress will be even more 
restrictive by prohibiting such mergers unless the domestic parent makes 
 
 
 264. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 266. See McKinnon et al., supra note 76 (“The Obama administration’s move to tighten rules on 
corporate inversions should discourage new deals, at least for a while, by making them harder and less 
profitable, tax experts said.”). 
 267. See Editorial Board, supra note 233. 
 268. McKinnon et al., supra note 76 (“Taking regulatory action ‘could take the pressure off for 
corporate-tax reform, which is the main thing to do,’ said Sen. Charles Grassley (R., Iowa) . . . .”). 
 269. See Patton, supra note 184 (“Legislators have often changed the . . . [C]ode . . . and projected 
success based on certain assumptions. What often seems to be overlooked is human behavior. In other 
words, though Washington may assume a static response, legislation often falls short . . . because they 
fail to consider how those affected by the legislation might alter their behavior.”). 
 270. See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 271. Patton, supra note 184 (“Rather than reduce the corporate tax burden, giving corporations a 
reason to remain in the U.S., it appears the government has taken an adversarial posture once again.”). 
 272. See infra notes 273–89 and accompanying text. 
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up no more than half of the new firm.
273
 However, such restrictions may 
actually incentivize nascent businesses to incorporate abroad from the 
outset in order to comply with the new rules, so that jobs and money are 
never brought to the United States to begin with.
274
  
Martin Regalia, the leading economist at the US Chamber of 
Commerce, espouses the view that Treasury’s September 2014 effort to 
stymie inversions will encourage companies to develop new jobs 
abroad.
275
 Regalia criticized regulators, saying that “the administration just 
assured that deferred income in the once foreign subsidiary will never 
come back to the U.S. to help create income, jobs, and economic growth 
here.”276 Others have suggested that inversions actually harm the US labor 
force by sending jobs overseas to the countries in which expatriated 
corporations are reincorporating.
277
 This view is mistaken, however, 
because inversions are strictly “paper transactions” and do not actually 
require corporations to move any jobs or facilities abroad.
278
 Conversely, 
limiting the ability of corporations to invert actually does incentivize 
companies to send US jobs to foreign countries, because when inversions 
are regulated to the point of impracticality, “paper transactions” are no 
longer sufficient to relieve heavy tax burdens.
279
 
Another way that corporations can avoid the reach of current US 
regulation, which also has negative implications for the economy, is by 
following what Washington Post columnist Allan Sloan has dubbed the 
“never-here” route.280 Major businesses that have followed this route 
include formerly privately-held companies such as Seagate and 
Accenture.
281
 Seagate, for example, started as a US company and 
underwent a “going private”282 transaction in a buyout.283 Its owners then 
moved it as a private company to the Cayman Islands,
284
 where they 
 
 
 273. See McKinnon et al., supra note 76. 
 274. See id. 
 275. McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 176. 
 276. Id. (quoting Martin Regalia). 
 277. Sheppard, supra note 27, at 559. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. at 559–60. 
 280. Sloan, supra note 54 (“We’ve also got a second, related problem, which I call the ‘never-
heres.’”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. “This procedure leaves only that group of insiders who direct the corporate reacquisition 
programs (usually the very ones who took the companies public originally) as the surviving 
shareholders in a now privately held enterprise. Such a program of share reacquisition is known as 
‘going private.’” Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 903 (1975). 
 283.  Sloan, supra note 54. 
 284. The Cayman Islands are a tax haven. Rosenzweig, supra note 166, at 961. 
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subsequently implemented a “going public”285 transaction.286 Seagate then 
moved as a public company from the Cayman Islands to Ireland
287
 a few 
years later.
288
 According to Sloan, “[f]irms like these can duck lots of U.S. 
taxes without being accused of having deserted our country because 
technically they were never here.”289 While these transactions do not 
actually qualify as inversions, never-here deals could become more 
commonplace as additional regulations are passed to restrict inversions. 
Since these transactions have the same effect of diminishing the corporate 
tax base, there is no reason to prefer regulations that encourage would-be 
inverters to follow the path taken by Seagate and Accenture rather than the 
traditional inversion route that has existed since the 1980s.
290
 
In light of the historical ineffectiveness
291
 of policies that seek to 
prevent corporations from expatriating to foreign countries with more 
advantageous tax regimes, the United States should embrace the new 
reality that it is but a single player on a competitive international stage. 
There was once a time when the United States paced the market and could 
charge essentially whatever tax rates it desired because there was a sense 
that the United States was the financial, political, and economic capital of 
the world.
292
 This paradigm no longer applies, however, because of the 
increasing global influence of economies such as the European Union, 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
293
 The United States is now better 
understood as one of the world’s economic superpowers, not the economic 
superpower.
294
 Recognizing that it is now just one country among many 
vying to be the home of massive multinational corporations, the United 
States must reposition itself to become more competitive globally. 
 
 
 285. “Going public” happens when a company “mak[es] the transition from being privately owned 
to having shares traded and owned by public investors.” Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial 
Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 712 (2005). 
 286. See Sloan, supra note 54. 
 287. Ireland has a corporate tax rate of about 12.5 percent. Lorenzetti, supra note 40. 
 288. Sloan, supra note 54. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See id. Companies’ following the never-here route may undermine the tax base and further 
reduce the public’s perception of corporations. Id. “[S]ome 60 U.S. companies have chosen the never-
here or the inversion route, and others are lining up to leave.” Id. Since both a corporation’s choosing a 
typical inversion transaction and a company’s utilizing the never-here route diminish the US corporate 
tax base, there seems to be little reason to prefer one path to the other. See id. 
 291. See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 292. See generally John E. Rielly, America Unbound: The Future of American Hegemony, 30 VT. 
L. REV. 123 (2005).  
 293. See generally Mark C. Anderson, A Tougher Row to Hoe: The European Union’s Ascension 
as a Global Superpower Analyzed Through the American Federal Experience, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L 
L. & COM. 83 (2001). 
 294. See generally id. 
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Countries compete for corporations based on the favorability of their 
tax rates, and the relative benefits of their infrastructure, educational 
institutions, financial markets, and legal systems.
295
 The United States is 
no longer competitive on the basis of its tax laws. It can be expected, 
furthermore, that rival countries will continue to close the gap in other 
ways as more companies leave the United States or refuse to initially 
incorporate here because of burdensome US taxes.
296
 As companies leave 
the United States, corporate earnings and associated tax revenues will flow 
into foreign countries. This allows those countries to improve their 
infrastructure, reducing any comparative US advantage in that respect, and 
further compounds the erosion of the United States’ appeal as a home for 
multinationals.
297
 Accordingly, it is imperative that the United States 
acknowledge that its interests are best advanced by working with 
businesses to give them reasons to incorporate domestically, thereby 
securing critical corporate revenues and jobs for the future. 
As an alternative to perpetuating the cycle of reactive regulations that 
invariably only temporarily slow the pace of inversions,
298
 the United 
States should implement comprehensive corporate tax reform that makes 
the US competitive with other industrialized nations. An improved 
corporate tax structure would adhere to two primary notions: 
“competitiveness and neutrality.”299 Placing an upper limit for corporate 
taxes around 25 percent and abandoning the anachronistic worldwide tax 
system for a territorial system would be an excellent core around which to 
 
 
 295. “President Clinton frequently would say that each nation is ‘like a big corporation competing 
in the global marketplace.’” Michael S. Knoll, The Connection Between Competitiveness and 
International Taxation, 65 TAX L. REV. 349, 352 (2012); see also Simeon Djankov et al., The Effect of 
Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship app. A (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13756, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13756.pdf (finding that 
the United States has the third-highest five-year effective tax rate out of eighty-five countries studied, 
behind only Bolivia and Pakistan). 
 296. See generally supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 297. Bono, front man of the band U2, said the following about his homeland of Ireland: “We are a 
tiny little country, we don’t have scale, and our version of scale is to be innovative and clever, and tax 
competitiveness has brought our country the only prosperity we’ve known.” Rupert Neate, Bono: 
Controversial Tax Laws Have Brought Ireland the Only Prosperity It’s Ever Known, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 11, 2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/bono-tax-laws-bring-ireland-
prosperity-apple-google-u2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 298. See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 299. Pomerleau & Lundeen, supra note 41. “A competitive tax code is a code that limits the 
taxation of businesses and investment. . . . A neutral tax code raises the most amount of revenue with 
the fewest number of economic distortions. . . . [I]t doesn’t favor consumption over saving, as happens 
with capital gains and dividend taxes . . . .” Id. 
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base reform.
300
 Such changes would remove the incentives for 
corporations to invert and would instead give multinationals a good reason 
to locate in the United States, especially considering the infrastructure, 
educational opportunities, financial markets, and other resources the 
United States has to offer. According to Tony James, President and Chief 
Operating Officer of Blackstone and a major supporter of Obama, the 
President is open to seeking a bipartisan deal on corporate taxation, if he 
can find support from both Democratic and Republican centrists with 
whom he can partner.
301
 “‘If that happened, the business community 
would be wildly enthusiastic,’ James said. ‘I think the economy could 
easily pick up another point or two of growth.’”302 While it would 
certainly be a challenging process and while there would be much 
disagreement over the particulars of the change to be implemented, the 
United States would benefit greatly from politicians willing to invest the 
political capital required to make a meaningful difference. As the need for 
corporate tax reform becomes increasingly apparent in Washington, 
irrespective of party loyalties,
303
 it seems that the time for a major 
reevaluation of the Code’s treatment of corporate taxation is drawing near. 
V. CONCLUSION 
After measured consideration of the corporate tax inversions that have 
been taking place for the past thirty years and the inadequacy of the 
government’s subsequent responses,304 it is clear that the Code requires 
more substantive revision.
305
 By taxing corporations at maximum statutory 
rates otherwise unheard of in the developed world
306
 and claiming tax 
jurisdiction over corporations’ worldwide earnings,307 the United States is 
poorly positioned to be globally competitive as a home for businesses. 
While corporate tax rates have generally been declining worldwide over 
the past two decades, the United States has not kept pace, and—in order to 
compete against multinationals abroad—US businesses have crafted their 
own solution: corporate tax inversions.
308
 After thirty years of failed 
 
 
 300. See id. This would improve US employment and wages and the domestic standard of living. 
Id. 
 301. See Warmbrodt & Prior, supra note 82. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 305. See supra Part IV. 
 306. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra Part II.B. 
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attempts to block companies from engaging in the practice, or to at least 
lessen the incentive to invert by imposing various penalties, it is time to 
consider a new, more permanent approach.
309
  
Former President Bill Clinton may have put it best when he said that 
“[w]e’re bailing water out of a leaky boat. . . . Either we undertake 
corporate tax reform, or every other country in the world says, ‘We are 
wrong and we’ll go back to the way we used to do it.’”310 The purpose of a 
corporation is to maximize value for shareholders,
311
 and a corporate 
fiduciary is obligated to make business decisions congruent with that 
purpose, rather than stoically defending the antiquated US tax system 
under the guise of “patriotism.”312 Despite the contentiousness of the issue, 
lawmakers on both sides of the aisle may find that there is more common 
ground than they had previously thought
313
 on priorities such as shoring up 
the tax base, simplifying the Code, and ensuring that the United States 
remains a global leader as a home for business and trade. If momentum 
can be sustained, Washington may finally be ready for the first 
comprehensive revision of the tax code in twenty years.
314
 
John C. Hamlett

 
 
 
 309. See supra Parts II.D, IV.B. 
 310. Campbell, supra note 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is practical economics 
and practical politics,” said Bill Clinton. Lorenzetti, supra note 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 311. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 312. See generally Sloan, supra note 54. Inversions are “a new kind of American corporate 
exceptionalism.” Id.; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 314. The current corporate tax structure has been in place since 1993. See Lorenzetti, supra note 
40. 
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